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REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON DEFENDANTS WHO DID 
NOT KILL OR INTEND TO KILL 
INTRODUCTION 
A man stalks a playground where young children are enjoying their 
afternoon recess.  He convinces a six-year-old girl to help him find his lost 
puppy.  Once outside the school fence, the man grabs the girl and takes her to a 
remote wooded area, where he rapes and sodomizes her.  He cannot take the 
chance of the girl telling her parents, so when he is finished, he picks up a rock 
and crushes her skull.  You see, if she would have told anyone about their 
encounter, he would have had to go back to prison, where he just finished 
serving time for raping a minor. 
The man is apprehended.  He is tried by a jury of his peers.1  He is 
sentenced to death.2 
In the next county, an unemployed woman is told about a “fool-proof” plan 
to get some quick cash.  Her boyfriend tells her about a drug-dealing neighbor 
who keeps a lot of cash in his house, and who is not likely to report a robbery.  
They formulate a plan in which they will sneak into the house, the boyfriend 
will threaten the owner with a sawed-off shotgun, and the two will take any 
money they can find.  Because her rent already is a month past due, and 
believing that no one would get hurt, she agrees to help with the robbery.  
When they get to the house, the woman, as planned, is unarmed.  However, 
before she realizes what is happening, the boyfriend breaks through a window, 
enters the home, and immediately shoots the owner in the head.3 
 
 1. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants criminal defendants the right to be 
tried by an impartial jury from the state and district where the defendant allegedly committed the 
crime.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”). 
 2. This hypothetical death sentence is based on the Oklahoma murder and death penalty 
statutes: “A person commits murder in the first degree when that person unlawfully and with 
malice aforethought causes the death of another human being.  Malice is that deliberate intention 
unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances 
capable of proof.”  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7.A (West Supp. 2006).  In Oklahoma, a 
person who is convicted of first degree murder can be punished by death.  § 701.9.A. 
 3. The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on those in State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 
1067 (1987).  In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder under Maine’s accomplice 
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The woman is apprehended.  She is tried by a jury of her peers.4  She, too, 
is sentenced to death.5 
The first hypothetical crime is one that legitimately may be classified as 
among “the most serious of crimes.”6  After terrorizing the young girl, the 
defendant formed the intent to kill her and did, in fact, kill her simply because 
he did not want to take the chance of returning to prison. 
In the second example, the defendant did not intend for anyone to get 
hurt—much less, to be killed.  Although her intentions were not innocent, they 
did not include fatal violence.  However, intent alone does not determine 
punishment in many jurisdictions.7 
In its two most recent decisions limiting the application of the death 
penalty, the Supreme Court reiterated that the death penalty must be reserved 
for offenders who are guilty of “a narrow category of the most serious 
crimes.”8  The Court emphasized that the death penalty only should apply to 
those who are “most deserving of execution” because of their “extreme 
culpability.”9 
Applying the death penalty in felony murder cases brings these concepts 
into serious question.10  Two landmark Supreme Court decisions have 
 
liability statute.  Id. at 1068.  To be convicted under an accomplice liability theory, which is the 
basis for a felony murder conviction of a nontriggerman, the defendant’s conduct does not have to 
be causally necessary for the crime to have occurred.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 470 (3d ed. 2001).  In other words, an accomplice can be liable for a murder even 
if the principal would have killed the victim without the defendant’s participation.  Id. 
 4. Again, according to the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.  See supra note 1. 
 5. This hypothetical death sentence also is based on the Oklahoma murder and death 
penalty statutes.  §§ 701.7.A, 701.9.A.  “A person . . . commits the crime of murder in the first 
degree, regardless of malice, when that person or any other person takes the life of a human being 
during, or if the death of a human being results from, the commission or attempted commission of 
[an enumerated felony].”  § 701.7.B. 
 6. While there is no precise definition of what constitutes the “most serious of crimes,” one 
author suggests that they are those crimes that “most outrage the conscience of the community.”  
SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING WITH THE 
DEATH PENALTY 34 (2003). 
 7. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West Supp. 2006): 
Unless an intent to kill is specifically required [in an enumerated special circumstance], an 
actual killer . . . need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the 
offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or 
confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-8 (Supp. 2006) (“Homicide perpetrated by an act imminently 
dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, is not the less 
murder because there was no actual intent to injure others.”). 
 8. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 
(2002). 
 9. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 10. Scott Turow maintains that the death penalty is not, in practice, reserved for the most 
egregious crimes and the most culpable offenders.  TUROW, supra note 6, at 71.  In Lake County, 
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attempted to define the parameters of when it is constitutional to impose the 
death penalty on defendants who participate in felonies in which someone is 
killed, but who did not themselves kill or intend to kill.11  In Enmund v. 
Florida, the Court held that, to apply the death penalty, a defendant must have 
intended for a killing to take place.12  Five years later, in Tison v. Arizona, the 
Court clarified that the culpability requirement for imposing the death penalty 
can be satisfied by the defendant’s “major participation in the felony,” and his 
or her “reckless indifference to human life.”13 
Two years after deciding Tison, the Court decided two other landmark 
cases, upholding the death penalty in both of them.  In 1989, in Penry v. 
Lynaugh, the Court held that executing mentally retarded offenders did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment.14  The same day that it ruled on Penry, the 
Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky that executing an offender who was sixteen 
or seventeen years old at the time of the crime did not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment.15  Together with Tison, these cases represent an era 
during which the Court narrowly defined “cruel and unusual punishment” so 
that it remained constitutional to execute certain categories of offenders. 
The Court may be entering a new era, as in 2002 and 2005, respectively, it 
held that mentally retarded offenders and juvenile offenders lack the 
culpability required to justify imposing the death penalty.16  In light of these 
decisions to restrict the use of the death penalty, which overruled Penry and 
Stanford, the Court may be primed to revisit the Tison issue of whether a 
 
Illinois, a man was sentenced to death when a botched robbery attempt resulted in the victim’s 
death.  Id.  While this defendant was sentenced to death, several other murderers did not receive 
the death penalty, including a mother who fed acid to her baby, a man who killed his friend by 
placing him on railroad tracks in front of an oncoming train, and a man who killed four people.  
Id. 
 11. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 
(1982). 
 12. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 13. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158. 
 14. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 15. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 16. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 
(2002).  The Atkins Court held that mentally retarded offenders are not among the most morally 
culpable “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their 
impulses . . . .”  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.  The Roper Court held that juveniles cannot be 
considered among the most culpable of offenders because of their lack of maturity, their 
susceptibility to outside pressure and influence, and their lack of character development as 
compared to adult offenders.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.  Turow suggests that the deterrent 
rationale does not justify executing juvenile offenders because they are among a class of citizens 
that are not capable of understanding the future.  TUROW, supra note 6, at 60.  In Turow’s 
experience in representing such offenders, they “act out a range of narcissistic and infantile 
impulses—rage, perverted self-loathing, or a grandiose conviction they’ll never be caught—in 
which consequences have no role.”  Id. 
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defendant who did not kill or intend to kill also lacks the culpability required to 
justify imposing the ultimate punishment.17  If the Court does revisit the issue 
for the first time in almost twenty years, it likely will consider the same factors 
that it has in most other death penalty decisions: 1) current legislative 
judgments, 2) culpability and justification rationales, 3) jury sentencing trends, 
and 4) international law and opinions. 
There has been no survey of state legislation since Tison to determine 
whether there has been a shift in the national consensus regarding the 
execution of nontriggermen.  This research will fill that gap.  This Comment 
will review current legislative judgments, culpability and justification 
rationales, and international law to analyze the constitutionality of imposing 
the death penalty on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill.18  Part I will 
review the Enmund and Tison decisions and the Court’s current position on the 
issue.  The author will provide a critique of the Tison Court’s claims and 
reasoning in Part II.  Part III will provide an analysis of current state statutes 
and compare the findings to those that the Court relied on in Tison.  Part IV 
will explore the culpability and justification rationales for applying the death 
penalty, and whether the goals of deterrence and retribution are satisfied when 
the death penalty is imposed on a defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.  
Part V will discuss current international law regarding the death penalty and 
whether executing defendants who did not kill or intend to kill violates 
international standards and treaties.  The Comment will conclude with the 
author’s reasoning as to why imposing the death penalty in felony murder 
cases that lack intent is contrary to the country’s “evolving standards of 
decency”19 and, therefore, is unconstitutional. 
I.  ENMUND AND TISON: INTENT VS. RECKLESSNESS 
A. Enmund v. Florida 
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in Enmund v. Florida that, in applying 
the death penalty, the punishment “must be tailored to [the defendant’s] 
personal responsibility and moral guilt.”20  The Court said that the Eighth 
 
 17. Also contributing to the decision’s vulnerability is the fact that Tison was a 5-4 decision.  
Tison, 481 U.S. 137. 
 18. This Comment will not explore or discuss jury sentencing decisions, but future research 
in this area would be valuable in determining how often juries actually impose the death penalty 
on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill. 
 19. Writing for the majority in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Kennedy explained that 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires the 
Court to refer to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”  543 U.S. at 560–61. 
 20. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
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Amendment21 prohibits executing a defendant who participated in an 
underlying felony in a felony murder case, but did not kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend for a killing to take place.22 
The Enmund case involved a botched robbery attempt in which two 
defendants shot and killed an elderly couple.23  The plan was for Sampson and 
Jeanette Armstrong to knock on the back door of the victims’ farmhouse, ask 
for water for an overheated car, and then demand money while holding one of 
the victims at gunpoint.24  The plan turned fatal when the victim’s wife came 
out of the house, shot Jeanette Armstrong, and then one of the Armstrongs shot 
and killed both victims.25  A jury sentenced Sampson Armstrong and the driver 
of the getaway car, Earl Enmund, to death.26 
The jury convicted Enmund based on Florida’s felony murder statute, 
which the judge summarized in the jury instructions: “The killing of a human 
being while engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate the 
offense of robbery is murder in the first degree even though there is no 
premeditated design or intent to kill.”27  Because one of Florida’s statutory 
aggravating circumstances was that the murder was committed while the 
defendant was “engaged in or an accomplice in the commission of an armed 
robbery,” Enmund essentially was eligible for the death penalty based solely 
on the fact that he participated in a robbery in which another person killed 
someone.28 
 
 21. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”).  Courts traditionally have found a punishment “cruel and 
unusual” if it does not have deterrent or retributive value, or if it is “grossly disproportionate to 
the severity of the crime.”  Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 144 (1987). 
 22. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 23. Id. at 784. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 785. 
 27. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 784–85. 
 28. Id. at 785.  The jury also found the following statutory aggravators to exist, in support of 
their verdict: 1) the defendant committed the capital felony for pecuniary gain, 2) the capital 
felony was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” and 3) the defendant previously was 
convicted of a violent felony.  Id.  The purpose of including aggravating circumstances in death 
penalty statutes is to force legislatures to create “exacting guidelines about the factual 
circumstances under which capital punishment may even be considered.”  TUROW, supra note 6, 
at 55.  However, legislatures tend to adjust the number of aggravating circumstances to 
correspond to electorate pressure.  Id. at 68.  For example, when a Chicago community policing 
volunteer was killed in 1998, the Illinois legislature responded by making the murder of a 
community policing volunteer eligible for capital punishment.  Id.  Felony murder aggravators 
provide prosecutors with a way to pursue the death penalty more easily than under other 
aggravating circumstances.  Id.  As a result, 60% of the condemned prisoners on Illinois’ death 
row were convicted and sentenced based on felony murder eligibility.  Id.  Turow argues that 
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the death penalty is 
constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for a defendant 
who “neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.”29  As it 
did in an earlier constitutional analysis of the death penalty, the Court 
considered the history of the punishment, current statutes, international 
opinion, and jury sentencing decisions.30 
1. Statutes 
At the time the Court decided Enmund, thirty-six state and federal 
jurisdictions authorized the death penalty.31  The Court used statistics 
summarizing the current status of death penalty statutes to support its finding 
that legislative judgment “weigh[ed] on the side of rejecting capital 
punishment for the crime at issue.”32 
Eleven states required the government to prove a defendant’s culpable 
mental state before the jury could impose the death penalty.33  In eight of those 
states, the mental state had to include an actual intent to kill.34 
On the other hand, only eight jurisdictions allowed the death penalty 
simply for participating in a robbery in which another robber kills someone 
(i.e., felony murder simpliciter).35  In four jurisdictions, felony murder was not 
a capital crime.36 
Nine states allowed for the death penalty to be imposed in a felony murder 
situation in which the defendant was not the actual killer only if the statutory 
aggravating circumstances were above and beyond the felony murder itself, 
and they outweighed the mitigating circumstances.37  In three of these states, 
felony murder was not included in the lists of statutory aggravating 
 
adding crimes to the list of felony murders that are eligible for the death penalty results in 
unfettered prosecutorial discretion as to when to pursue the death penalty, which in turn leads to 
unfair disbursement of the punishment.  Id. at 69.  While responding to the electorate and 
considering its concerns are fundamental duties of the legislature, the legislature must not respond 
to a simply emotional public by adding ways for a criminal to be executed. 
 29. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787. 
 30. Id. at 788–89.  The Court followed the same format in its analysis in Coker v. Georgia, 
where the Court held that it was unconstitutional to execute a defendant for the rape of an adult 
woman.  433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 31. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789. 
 32. Id. at 789–93. 
 33. Id. at 789–90. 
 34. Id. at 790.  The other three states required a showing “short of intent, such as 
recklessness or extreme indifference to human life.”  Id. 
 35. Id. at 789.  Felony murder simpliciter requires no showing of culpable intent to commit a 
homicide.  See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987).  Florida was one of the states that 
allowed the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter.  Id. at n.5. 
 36. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 791. 
 37. Id. at 791–92.  Depending on the aggravating circumstances, a defendant in these nine 
states could be put to death without proving an intent to kill.  Id. at 791. 
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circumstances.38  Six of these states, however, provided for a statutory 
mitigating circumstance in which the defendant’s participation in the capital 
felony was relatively minor compared to other actors in the crime.39  The Court 
reasoned that the states included these mitigating circumstances to reduce the 
chances of a defendant receiving the death penalty for a vicarious felony 
murder.40 
The Court summarized the statutory findings by pointing out that only 
about one-third of American jurisdictions would allow a defendant to be 
executed for the crime of participating in a robbery in which a murder 
occurred.41  In addition, none of the eight states that had enacted new death 
penalty legislation in the preceding four years allowed for the death penalty to 
be applied in such a situation.42 
2. International Opinion 
The majority in Enmund mentioned international opinion only in a 
footnote, to support its finding that the public considers the death penalty 
disproportionate in a case such as Enmund’s.43  The Court pointed out that 
India and England had abolished the felony murder doctrine and that Canada 
and several other countries had severely restricted it.44  Continental Europe, at 
the time, had never even recognized the doctrine.45 
3. Deterrence and Retribution 
The majority concluded its opinion with an analysis of the justifications for 
the death penalty and their application to the Enmund case.46  The “principal 
social purposes” that the death penalty addresses are retribution and 
deterrence.47  The Court found that these justifications do not apply to a case in 
which the defendant did not kill or intend to kill.48 
 
 38. Id. at 792. 
 39. Id. at 791–92. 
 40. Id. at 792.  In Roper v. Simmons, Justice O’Connor claimed that the presence of 
mitigators considering the age of the offender shows that the states contemplated the issue of 
whether seventeen-year-olds should be subjected to the death penalty and decided that a 
categorical ban was not appropriate.  543 U.S. 551, 606 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  These 
mitigators, O’Connor said, show that some legislatures have concluded that some seventeen-year-
olds are mature enough to deserve the punishment; therefore, the Court should not interfere with 
the legislatures’ judgments.  Id. at 606–07. 
 41. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 796 n.22. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797–801. 
 47. Id. at 798 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).  The Court noted that, 
unless the death penalty serves the goal of retribution or deterrence, it “is nothing more than the 
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To support its conclusion that the death penalty would not serve a deterrent 
function in Enmund’s case, the Court relied on research showing that only a 
very small fraction of robberies resulted in a homicide.49  Because the 
likelihood that someone would be killed in any given robbery was so small, the 
Court reasoned that an accomplice should not share the blame for a killing 
simply because he or she took part in the robbery.50 
For retribution to be a legitimate justification for the death penalty, the 
Court stressed that it must be proportionate to the defendant’s culpability.51  In 
Enmund’s case, his culpability was limited to his participation in the robbery, 
since he had no intention of anyone being killed.52  The Court summarized: 
“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he did not commit and 
had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to 
the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”53 
B. Tison v. Arizona 
Five years later, in 1987, the Tison Court stripped the Enmund holding of 
some of its effect by holding that the death penalty is constitutional in a felony 
murder case when 1) the defendant was a major participant in the underlying 
felony and 2) the defendant exhibited a reckless indifference to human life.54  
The Court did not overrule Enmund, but rather clarified that the above two 
elements actually combined to satisfy the culpability mandated in Enmund.55 
In Tison, the defendants, Ricky and Raymond Tison, took a chest full of 
guns into a prison to help their father, Gary Tison, and his cellmate, Randy 
Greenawalt, escape.56  During the escape, no one fired any shots and no one 
was injured.57  However, a couple of days after the escape, the group decided 
to steal a car.58  One of the defendants flagged down a car that was occupied by 
a man, his wife, their two-year-old son, and their fifteen-year-old niece, to help 
 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” which would make it an 
unconstitutional punishment.  Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). 
 48. Id. at 799–801. 
 49. Id. at 799 n.23.  A recent study at the time that the Court decided Enmund showed that 
only 0.43% of robberies in the U.S. ended in homicide.  Id. at 800 n.24. 
 50. Id. at 801.  The Court said: “It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the 
course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he 
somehow participated in the felony.”  Id. at 799. 
 51. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800. 
 52. Id. at 801. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 139.  Gary Tison was serving a life sentence for killing a guard during a previous 
escape attempt.  Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 139–40. 
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with a “flat tire.”59  The criminals drove the family into a deserted area, where 
they planned to switch cars with the family.60  After telling the family to stand 
in front of one of the cars, Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt shot and killed 
all four of them.61  The Tison brothers claimed they were surprised by the 
shooting, but admitted that they did not try to help the family.62 
The Tison brothers and Greenawalt were tried separately for the capital 
murders of the four victims.63  The Tisons were convicted based on Arizona’s 
felony murder statute, which made it a capital offense for someone to be 
involved in a kidnapping or robbery in which a person is killed.64  The judge 
sentenced both of the Tisons to death.65 
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted “intent” to include 
recklessness and subsequently found that because of his reckless participation 
in the crime, Raymond Tison did intend to kill; therefore, his death sentence 
did not violate Enmund.66  The Arizona court reasoned that, because Raymond 
played an active part in all of the events leading up to the murders (including 
providing weapons when he knew of his father’s murder conviction), and 
because he did nothing to stop the murders or to disassociate himself from his 
father and Greenawalt after the murders, he intended to kill.67  In Ricky 
Tison’s appeal, the court said that Ricky’s involvement basically was the same 
as Raymond’s and that his death sentence would not violate Enmund.68 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari as to the issue of whether the Eighth 
Amendment bars the application of the death penalty to a defendant who 
played a substantial role in the underlying felony and who acted with reckless 
indifference to the value of human life.69  The Court again relied heavily on 
state legislatures’ judgment in assessing the proportionality of the 
punishment.70  The majority ended with a brief discussion about culpability, 
but it based its decision mostly on the status of state legislation.71 
 
 59. Tison, 481 U.S. at 140. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 140–41. 
 62. Id. at 141. 
 63. Id.  Gary Tison died of exposure after escaping to the desert.  Id.  Another Tison brother 
who was involved, Donald Tison, died in a police shootout following the murders.  Id. 
 64. Tison, 481 U.S. at 141. 
 65. Id. at 143. 
 66. Id. at 143–45, 151. 
 67. Id. at 144–45. 
 68. Id. at 145, 151. 
 69. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. at 152.  The Court explained that the Enmund Court did not 
address this specific situation.  Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 158. 
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1. Statutes 
The Court began its analysis by pointing out that “four states authorize[d] 
the death penalty in felony murder cases” in which the defendant acted with a 
“culpable mental state such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human 
life.”72  The Court did not specifically mention, as the Enmund Court did, how 
many states required a showing of intent to kill before the death penalty could 
be applied in a felony murder case.73 
The Court claimed that a majority of jurisdictions “specifically authorize” 
the death penalty in a felony murder case when the defendant substantially 
participated in a felony in which he knew there was a high likelihood of 
death.74  In its calculation of a “majority,” the Court included the following: 
the four states referenced above that allowed for the death penalty in felony 
murder cases as long as the defendant acted with a culpable mental state, two 
states that required that the defendant’s participation be “substantial” before 
authorizing the death penalty, at least six states that provided a statutory 
mitigator of minor participation in the felony, six states that allowed the death 
penalty for felony murder simpliciter, and three states that required proof of an 
additional aggravator before imposing the death penalty.75 
According to the Tison Court, only a “small minority” of jurisdictions that 
allowed the death penalty for felony murder required an intent to kill before 
imposing the punishment.76  Specifically, the Court said that eleven death 
penalty states prohibited imposing the death penalty in situations in which “the 
defendant’s participation in the felony murder is major and the likelihood of 
killing is so substantial as to raise an inference of extreme recklessness.”77 
As for statutory changes that took place between Enmund and Tison, the 
Court conceded, in a footnote, that Mississippi and Nevada had changed their 
statutes since Enmund to require a finding that “the defendant killed, attempted 
to kill, or intended to kill, or that lethal force be employed.”78  The Court also 
mentioned that New Jersey recently had enacted legislation allowing for the 
death penalty in intentional murder cases, but not in felony murder cases.79  In 
1985, Oregon began authorizing the death penalty for felony murders, but only 
if the defendant intended to kill.80  After Enmund, Vermont changed its death 
 
 72. Id. at 152–53. 
 73. Id. at 152–55. 
 74. Tison, 481 U.S. at 153–54. 
 75. Id. at 152–54. 
 76. Id. at 158. 
 77. Id. at 154. 
 78. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 79. Tison, 481 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 80. Id. 
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penalty statute to allow for the punishment only in circumstances in which a 
correctional officer was killed.81 
2. Culpability 
After finding that “a majority of American jurisdictions clearly authorize 
capital punishment” for cases such as the Tisons’, the Court went on to assess 
the proportionality of the punishment.82  The Court pointed out that a 
defendant’s mental state is critical in determining culpability in a capital 
crime.83  Also critical is the idea that the more purposeful the conduct, and the 
more serious the crime, the harsher the punishment should be.84 
The Court disagreed with the notion that an intent to kill can distinguish 
the most culpable and dangerous killers.85  It reasoned that some killers who 
intended to kill are not even criminally liable, such as those who do so in self-
defense.86  On the other hand, the Court said, murder lacking intent, such as 
that involving torture or committed during a robbery, can be the most 
dangerous and inhumane.87  The reckless indifference to the value of human 
life that is inherent in such crimes can, according to the Court, shock the 
“moral sense” just as much as an intent to kill.88 
The Tison Court summarized the Enmund Court holding as follows: “when 
‘intent to kill’ results in its logical though not inevitable consequence—the 
taking of human life—the Eighth Amendment permits the State to exact the 
death penalty . . . .”89  The Tison Court took the Enmund holding a step further, 
holding that “reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging 
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly 
culpable mental state . . . that may be taken into account in making a capital 
sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though not 
inevitable, lethal result.”90  This language establishes that reckless participation 
in certain dangerous felonies may involve a culpable mental state on par with 
other capital crimes and is worthy of the death penalty.91 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 155. 
 83. Id. at 156. 
 84. Tison, 481 U.S. at 156. 
 85. Id. at 157. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Tison, 481 U.S. at 157. 
 90. Id. at 157–58. 
 91. The determination of whether a particular crime carries a “grave risk of death” is fact-
sensitive.  For example, although not all robberies may be included in this category, one that 
involved a convicted killer who recently broke out of prison and was armed with an arsenal of 
weapons most likely would be. 
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II.  CRITIQUE OF THE TISON OPINION 
A. Brennan’s Dissent 
Writing for a four-Justice dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out several 
flaws in the majority’s opinion.92  The dissent criticized the majority for 
neglecting to include a proper proportionality analysis, which the Constitution 
requires.93  Justice Brennan asserted that, absent a defendant’s intent to kill, a 
death sentence cannot be proportional.94 
The dissent provided a summary of the Enmund Court’s proportionality 
review, including its analysis of the retributive and deterrent functions of the 
Enmund decision.95  Justice Brennan also pointed out several flaws in how the 
Court calculated the states’ legislative judgments regarding imposing the death 
penalty in cases such as the Tisons’.96  In addition, according to the dissent, a 
complete and proper constitutional analysis of the death penalty requires the 
Court to review jury sentencing trends and the actual imposition of the death 
penalty in similar cases, which the majority did not do.97 
The majority’s incomplete constitutional analysis was reason enough for 
the four Justices to dissent.98  However, Justice Brennan inferred that the most 
disturbing aspect of the opinion was that the Court’s new rule could result in 
arbitrary results in virtually identical cases.99 
B. Flawed Calculations 
Much of the Tison majority’s opinion consisted of a survey of then-current 
state death penalty statutes.100  As mentioned above, the majority did not 
provide a deterrent rationale to support its decision, nor did it review jury 
sentencing decisions.  Because the legislative judgments are among the only 
objective criteria that the Court uses to justify new rules regarding the death 
penalty, it is critical that the numbers are accurate and are not misleading.101  
 
 92. Tison, 481 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens joined in the dissent. 
 93. Id. at 168. 
 94. Id. at 170. 
 95. Id. at 172–74. 
 96. Id. at 174–75. 
 97. Tison, 481 U.S. 176–79. 
 98. Id. at 182. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. at 152–55 (majority opinion). 
 101. The Atkins decision, as well as other major death penalty decisions, stressed the 
importance of using objective factors in a death penalty proportionality review.  Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).  “Proportionality review under those evolving standards 
should be informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent.’”  Id. (quoting 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991)). 
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As the Court reiterated in Atkins v. Virginia, “the clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 
country’s legislatures.”102  Such evidence is clear and reliable only if 
calculated and interpreted correctly. 
The majority did not include in its calculations jurisdictions that did not 
have a death penalty, nor those that authorized it only in circumstances other 
than those described in the Tison opinion.103  If the Court had included these 
jurisdictions in its analysis, it would have been forced to admit that a majority 
of jurisdictions at that time prohibited imposing the death penalty on 
nontriggermen104 who did not intend to kill.105 
At the time of the opinion, thirteen states and the District of Columbia had 
abolished the death penalty, and four other states restricted the death penalty to 
those who actually and intentionally kill.106  The majority, on the other hand, 
claimed that “only [eleven] states authorizing capital punishment forbid 
imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant’s participation in the 
felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise 
an inference of extreme recklessness.”107  However, this statement is 
misleading because the majority apparently included in its sample only states 
that authorized the death penalty for felony murder—not all states that 
authorized the death penalty.  The more accurate statement would be that “only 
[eleven] states authorizing capital punishment [for felony murder] forbid 
imposition of the death penalty even though the defendant’s participation in the 
felony murder is major and the likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise 
an inference of extreme recklessness.”  In actuality, fifteen states authorizing 
capital punishment refused to impose the death penalty under such 
circumstances, and twenty-nine jurisdictions altogether forbade it.108 
1. No “Specific Authorization” 
As mentioned above, the Court claimed that a majority of jurisdictions 
“specifically authorize” the death penalty in felony murder cases where the 
defendant may not have had an intent to kill, but was a major participant “in a 
 
 102. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
 103. Tison, 481 U.S. at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 104. This Comment will use the term “nontriggermen” to refer to defendants in a felony 
murder case who did not actually kill (or attempt to kill). 
 105. Tison, 481 U.S. at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 175 n.13. 
 107. Id. at 154 (majority opinion). 
 108. The twenty-nine jurisdictions consisted of the fifteen death penalty states that did not 
allow for the death penalty under these circumstances, plus the thirteen states, along with the 
District of Columbia, that did not allow the death penalty under any circumstances.  Id. at 175 & 
n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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felony in which he knew death was highly likely to occur.”109  This author 
disagrees with the Court’s use of the phrase “specifically authorize[s],” 
because no statute’s plain language authorizes the imposition of the death 
penalty in the circumstances described by the Court.  Even if the Court 
interprets the statutes as allowing the death penalty for the situation, to say that 
the jurisdictions “specifically authorize” it implies legislative intent that is not 
as obvious as the phrase suggests. 
If the legislators had intended to “specifically authorize” the death penalty 
in certain circumstances, they most likely would have spelled out those 
circumstances in the statute.  If the legislature did not spell out the 
circumstances, then it actually is the Court that is authorizing the punishment.  
This legitimately can be within a court’s discretion, but the Court should not 
attempt to use legislative intent to support its decision when such legislative 
intent may not exist. 
2. Overlapping Categories 
The subcategories into which the majority placed the states are not 
mutually exclusive, as the opinion implies.  For example, a state that requires 
proof of an additional aggravator also may provide a statutory mitigator that 
considers a defendant’s minor participation in the felony or may require proof 
of a culpable mental state, or both.110  Therefore, the majority’s grouping 
would not work today because adding the subgroups together would result in 
double- or triple-counting some states. 
Placing the states into so many categories tends to confuse the reader and 
complicate the issue.  The ultimate issue that the Court appeared ready to 
address was whether it is constitutional to impose the death penalty on a 
defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.111  However, if the Court had 
remained focused on this issue, then it may not have been able to support its 
decision with its analysis of legislative judgments.  Therefore, the Tison 
majority ended up creating a narrowly defined category that it could stretch the 
legislative findings to support, and which would allow the Court to impose the 
death penalty on the Tison brothers. 
 
 109. Id. at 154 (majority opinion). 
 110. It is not clear whether the categories were mutually exclusive at the time of the Tison 
decision, but they currently are not.  If they were not mutually exclusive at the time of the 
decision, then the majority’s reasoning is even more flawed because the citations do not 
accurately represent all of the states that fell into each category. 
 111. In her introduction to the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor explained: “The question 
presented is whether the petitioners’ participation in the events leading up to and following the 
murder . . . makes the sentences of death . . . constitutionally permissible although neither 
petitioner specifically intended to kill the victims and neither inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds.”  
Tison, 481 U.S. at 138. 
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C. Weak Culpability Argument 
The Tison majority conceded that a defendant’s state of mind is a key 
factor in determining his or her culpability in a capital case.112  It admitted that 
the American legal tradition is based on the concept that “the more purposeful 
is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the 
more severely it ought to be punished.”113  However, the majority used weak 
examples and seemed to stretch precedent in an effort to reconcile these 
concepts with imposing the death penalty on the Tisons. 
The Tison majority referred to the Enmund decision, claiming that the 
Court in that case allowed the death penalty “at least” in cases where the 
felony murderer intentionally killed.114  This summary of the holding was 
inaccurate.  The Enmund Court specifically noted that Enmund did not kill nor 
intend to kill; therefore, his culpability was less than that of his accomplices 
who did kill.115  The Court said that the Eighth Amendment did not allow for 
the actual killers and Enmund to be treated alike and to be assigned the same 
culpability.116 
The Enmund Court noted, “It is fundamental that ‘causing harm 
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm 
unintentionally.’”117  There is no more severe punishment than execution, so in 
basing its opinion on this principle, the Enmund Court established that the 
death penalty cannot be imposed on someone who did not intend to kill. 
The Tison majority then went on to argue that intent to kill is an ineffective 
way of “definitively distinguishing the most culpable and dangerous of 
murderers.”118  However, the Enmund Court did not claim that intent should 
“definitively distinguish” the most culpable offenders.  Rather, the Enmund 
Court implied that intent to kill was one of the characteristics separating the 
most culpable offenders from those less culpable—not the only characteristic 
distinguishing them.  In other words, the Court was saying that if you have A 
(the most culpable offenders), then you must have B (intent); however, the 
Court was not necessarily saying the inverse is true (that if you have B, you 
must have A).  The Enmund Court’s logic, therefore, is not at odds with the 
Tison majority’s assessment that those who intentionally kill after being 
provoked are not as deserving of the death penalty.119 
 
 112. Id. at 156. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (quoting H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 158, 162 (1968)). 
 118. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). 
 119. See id. 
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The Court’s examples of dangerous murderers who kill “unintentionally” 
also are misleading.120  Murder resulting from torture cannot be considered 
unintentional when the murderer continually inflicted pain and suffering on 
someone, most likely expecting the person to die.121  At least one state 
specifically defines torture as including a specific intent to kill.122  As to the 
Court’s other example, if a robber shoots someone during the course of a 
robbery, it most likely is intentional, even if not premeditated.123  Even in the 
Tison case, no one disputed whether the actual shooters intended to kill the 
victims during the kidnapping and robbery or whether these men were among 
the most dangerous of criminals.  Gary Tison and Randy Greenawalt 
apparently shot the family intentionally, and they may be considered among 
the most culpable, dangerous, and inhumane murderers. 
D. No Deterrence Rationale 
The Tison majority did not discuss the deterrence rationale for applying the 
death penalty to situations in which the defendant did not kill or intend to kill.  
A Supreme Court opinion regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty is 
incomplete without a discussion of both of the primary justifications for 
punishment.  Other major death penalty Supreme Court opinions in recent 
 
 120. See id. at 170 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court’s examples of 
torture and murder during a robbery are wanton, yet intentional killings). 
 121. See id. at 157 (majority opinion) (listing torture as an example of an unintentional 
murder that is among the most dangerous and inhumane of crimes).  In the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United Nations 
defines torture as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
art. 1, § 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027.  The U.S. federal government defines torture as “an act 
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) 
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”  18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000). 
 122. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004) (“torture causing death shall be deemed the 
equivalent of intent to kill”). 
 123. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 170 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that premeditation 
and deliberation—not intent—are missing from the Court’s examples). 
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history discuss how the holding supports the goal of deterrence,124 so the 
absence of such a discussion is conspicuous in Tison. 
Because the Court claimed that its decision was not contrary to its holding 
in Enmund, the fact that it did not discuss the deterrent value of its decision 
could imply that the Court was in agreement with its analysis of the subject in 
Enmund.125  The Enmund discussion on the subject, however, would not 
support the Court’s holding in Tison.126  One also might infer that the Court 
could not reconcile its holding with the goal of deterrence, so it left the 
discussion out of its opinion.  Because the Court essentially is deciding 
whether a group of offenders lives or dies, it must be able to justify its decision 
by saying that the punishment would serve this social purpose. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENTS 
The ultimate issue that this Comment seeks to answer is whether the 
Supreme Court still would find that it is constitutional to impose the death 
penalty on a defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.  This research 
included reviewing each of the state death penalty statutes, considering 
whether the statute would allow the death penalty to be imposed on such a 
defendant.  The author then reviewed each statute and compared its current 
status with how it was interpreted by the Tison majority. 
A. States Forbidding the Death Penalty when the Defendant Did Not Kill or 
Intend to Kill 
Currently, thirty-eight states authorize the use of the death penalty.127  Of 
those thirty-eight states, sixteen prohibit imposing the death penalty on a 
defendant who did not kill or intend to kill.128  Before the death penalty can be 
 
 124. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (finding that executing juvenile 
offenders cannot be justified by the goals of retribution and deterrence); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 319–20 (2002) (finding that executing mentally retarded offenders does not further the 
goals of retribution and deterrence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797–801(1982) (finding 
that executing a defendant to avenge murders that he did not commit nor intend to commit does 
not contribute to the retribution or deterrence goals). 
 125. Justice Brennan referred to the Enmund Court’s deterrence and retribution discussion to 
support the position that the Tison holding was inconsistent with Enmund.  Tison, 481 U.S. at 
172–73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 46–50. 
 127. The following states’ statutes allow for the imposition of the death penalty: Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579, app. A (2005). 
 128. Based on the author’s research, the following states do not allow the death penalty to be 
imposed on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill: Alabama, Connecticut, Kansas, 
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imposed, fifteen states specifically require that a defendant purposely, 
knowingly, or intentionally killed the victim.129  In Maryland, only a murder 
defendant who is a principal in the first degree (presumably the killer) is 
eligible for the death penalty.130 
B. States Allowing the Death Penalty for Nontriggermen Who Did Not Intend 
to Kill 
Twenty-two states authorize the death penalty for nontriggermen who had 
no intent to kill, but a majority of them have statutory safeguards to minimize 
the risk of sentencing such defendants to death.131  This group consists of states 
whose statutes: 1) require the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least 
one aggravating circumstance in addition to the fact that the murder occurred 
during the course of a felony, 2) require the state to prove that a nontriggerman 
defendant acted with a culpable mental state, and 3) allow imposition of the 
death penalty on nontriggermen simply because they participated in the 
underlying felony, referred to by the Tison Court as felony murder simpliciter, 
and 4) provide an affirmative defense that is applicable to some nontriggermen 
who did not intend to kill.132 
 
Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.  See infra note 129. 
 129. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(b), 13A-6-2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53a-54a (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 
(Supp. 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (1996); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3(a), (c) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. § 31-20A-5 (2000) (statutory 
aggravating circumstances all require an intent to kill, unless the victim was a police officer on 
duty); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (West 
Supp. 2006); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 
(Vernon Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030(1)(a), 10.95.020 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). 
 130. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2002).  A principal in the 
second degree may be eligible for the death penalty if the victim was a law enforcement officer.  
Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(ii).  If the victim was a law enforcement officer, a principal in the second degree 
still must have intended for the killing to take place, must have been a major participant in the 
murder, and must have been present when the murder occurred to be eligible for the death 
penalty.  Id. 
 131. According to the author’s research, the following states fall into this category: Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Deleware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming.  Although Kentucky does not have a felony murder statute, a 
nontriggerman who did not kill or intend to kill can be convicted of murder, a capital offense, if 
“under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of 
another person.”  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999). 
 132. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 153 (1987). 
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1. States Requiring Additional Aggravating Circumstances 
Thirteen of these twenty-two states require proof of at least one 
aggravating circumstance in addition to the fact that the murder occurred 
during the course of a felony.133  This requirement puts the statutes in 
compliance with Enmund, so that the death penalty cannot be imposed on 
nontriggermen simply because of their participation in the underlying crimes. 
2. States Requiring Proof of a Culpable Mental State 
Five states require the government to prove that a nontriggerman defendant 
acted with a culpable mental state.134  Of these states, Nevada and South 
Carolina require a showing that a murder defendant acted with malice 
aforethought, which can be express or implied.135  In fact, Nevada requires 
proof of malice aforethought and an additional aggravating circumstance.136  
For a nontriggerman in California or Kentucky to be eligible for the death 
penalty in a felony murder case, he or she must have acted with reckless or 
extreme indifference to human life.137  In Delaware, a defendant who 
 
 133. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E)–(F) (Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1.3-
1201(2)(b)(II)(A), 18-1.3-1201(5) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9) (Supp. 2006); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b) 
(LexisNexis 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) 
(Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12 (West 
2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h) (2005). 
 134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(d) (West Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(a)(2) 
(Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
200.010 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2003). 
 135. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.010 (2005) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, 
with malice aforethought, either express or implied . . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2003) 
(“‘Murder’ is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied.”). 
 136. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.010, 200.030(1)(b), 200.030(4)(a) (2005). 
 137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(d) (West Supp. 2006) (“[E]very person, not the actual killer, 
who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, 
commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of [an enumerated felony] 
which results in the death of some person or persons . . . shall be punished by death or 
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 507.020(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999) (“A person is guilty of murder when . . . under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of another 
person.”).  In Arkansas, a defendant can be guilty of capital murder if he or the killer acts with 
extreme indifference to human life: “A person commits capital murder if . . . acting alone or with 
one . . . or more other persons, the person commits or attempts to commit [an enumerated felony 
and] . . . the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . .”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
101(a)(1) (2006). 
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recklessly caused the death of someone during the course of an enumerated 
felony is eligible for the death penalty.138 
3. Felony Murder Simpliciter 
Only three states’ statutory language still provides for imposition of the 
death penalty on defendants for felony murder simpliciter.139  However, 
Enmund established that the death penalty for such crimes is unconstitutional, 
so the punishment could not be authorized in these states simply for 
participating in the underlying felony—despite what these statutes may 
imply.140  Of these states, the Florida statute allows the death penalty only if 
the killer was one of the people perpetrating the felony.141  Two of the three 
states take a defendant’s minor participation in the capital felony into account 
in mitigation of the murder.142 
4. Affirmative Defenses 
Three of these twenty-two states provide an affirmative defense for 
defendants who did not kill.143  The affirmative defenses include a showing 
 
 138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636(a)(2), 4209(e)(1)(j) (Supp. 2004). 
 139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006),  921.141(5)(d) (West 2006); GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-1(c) (2003), 17-10-30(b)(2) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-17, 15A-
2000(e)(5) (2005). The Montana statute allows the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter 
only in the specific case of aggravated kidnapping.  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102(1)(b), 46-18-
303(2) (2005). 
 140. It is likely that the state legislatures have not seen the need to update their statutes to 
reflect the Enmund rule and rely on the courts to make sure that sentencing is constitutional and 
in compliance with Supreme Court decisions. 
 141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(3) (West Supp. 2006) (specifying an offense as second degree 
murder if a person is killed by someone other than the person perpetrating or attempting to 
perpetrate the felony). 
 142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(d) (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(f)(4) 
(2005). 
 143. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(b) (2006) (providing an affirmative defense to prosecution 
under the felony murder doctrine if the defendant did not kill the victim “or in any way solicit, 
command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in the homicidal act’s commission”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (2006) (providing an affirmative defense to a felony murder charge if the 
defendant: 1) was not the only participant in the underlying felony, 2) did not kill or “in any way 
solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid in the [killing],” 3) was not armed, 4) had no 
reasonable ground to believe that the other participant was armed, 5) did not engage in conduct 
likely to result in death or serious bodily injury, nor had any reason to believe other participant 
would engage in such conduct, and 6) tried to dissociate himself from the underlying felony after 
having reasonable grounds to believe that other participants were armed or intended to inflict 
death or serious bodily injury on the victim); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(3)(a)–(e) (2005) 
(affirmative defense to a charge of felony murder if the defendant: 1) was not the only participant 
in the underlying felony, 2) did not kill or “in any way solicit, request, command, importune, 
cause or aid in the [killing],” 3) was not armed, 4) had no reasonable ground to believe that other 
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that the defendant did not kill or intend in any way for another participant to 
kill.144  Similarly, before a jury can impose the death penalty on a defendant in 
Mississippi, it must make a written finding that the defendant killed, attempted 
to kill, intended for the killing to happen, or contemplated that lethal force 
would be used.145 
However, in Arkansas, defendants such as the Tisons cannot use the 
affirmative defenses if they aid in the commission of the murder, as the Tisons 
did by supplying the weapons.  The Tisons would not have been able to use an 
affirmative defense in Colorado or Oregon because, at the very least, they 
knew that the killers (their accomplices) were armed. 
C. Comparison of Current Statutes to Those Characterized by the Tison 
Majority 
The Tison majority classified states according to various subgroups, 
including the following: 1) states that allow the death penalty with proof of a 
culpable mental state short of intent, 2) states in which the defendant’s 
participation must be substantial, 3) states that have statutory mitigators that 
take the defendant’s minor participation into account, 4) states that require 
proof of at least one additional aggravating circumstance, and 5) states that 
authorize the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter.146  The Court then 
grouped states into two distinct, mutually exclusive categories: 1) states that 
allow the death penalty in felony murder cases where the defendant did not 
intend to kill, but did substantially participate in a felony in which he knew it 
was highly likely that death would occur, and 2) states that do not allow the 
death penalty even when the defendant substantially participated in the felony 
murder and he or she acted with extreme recklessness.147 
Since the Court decided Tison, the number of states in each category has 
changed.  This section will review some of the more significant legislative 
changes. 
1. Affirmative Defenses 
The Tison majority did not specifically mention how many states provided 
affirmative defenses in their statutes for nontriggermen involved in felony 
murders.148  Seven states currently include affirmative defenses to murder in 
their statutes so that nontriggermen who did not intend to kill are not punished 
 
participants were armed, and 5) had no reasonable ground to believe that other participants would 
“engage in conduct likely to result in death”). 
 144. See supra note 143. 
 145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(7) (2000). 
 146. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152–53 (1987). 
 147. Id. at 154. 
 148. See id. at 152–54. 
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on the same level as triggermen and nontriggermen who intended for a killing 
to take place.149  Four states that provide an affirmative defense for such 
nontriggermen also require a showing of intent to kill before imposing the 
death penalty.150 
By providing these affirmative defenses, states that otherwise would allow 
the death penalty in felony murder cases are ensuring that a defendant’s 
participation in the felony murder is substantial before imposing the 
punishment.  The Tison majority characterized two jurisdictions as requiring a 
defendant’s substantial participation in the felony murder before allowing 
imposition of the death penalty: Connecticut and a federal jurisdiction151 
involving aircraft piracy.152  Connecticut no longer authorizes the death penalty 
for felony murder, but the affirmative defense serves as a safeguard against the 
murder conviction.153  Therefore, three states not cited by the Tison majority 
require substantial participation in the underlying felony before the death 
penalty can be applied.154 
2. Mitigators for Minor Participation in the Murder or Felony 
The Tison Court cited six states as taking minor participation in the felony 
into account in mitigation of the felony murder.155  Currently, twenty-one 
states have statutory mitigators that require a jury to consider the defendant’s 
level of participation or culpability in the crime before imposing the death 
penalty or other punishment.156  This jump represents a 250% increase in the 
number of states that impose this consideration on the jury. 
 
 149. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(b) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(2) (2006); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)–(d) (West 2005); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 125.25(3)(d) (McKinney Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(3)(a)–(e) (2005); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(1)(c)(i)–(iv) (West 2000). 
 150. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a), (c) 
(West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
9A.32.030(1)(a) (West 2000), 10.95.020 (West Supp. 2006). 
 151. The author’s analysis does not include a recent review of federal jurisdictions and federal 
legislative judgments. 
 152. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 153 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-46a(g)(4) (1985) and 49 
U.S.C. app. §1473(c)(6)(D)). 
 153. See State v. Amado, 719 A.2d 45, 45 (Conn. 1998) (explaining that “only intentional 
murders could serve as predicate for capital felony conviction”); State v. Johnson, 699 A.2d 57 
(Conn. 1997) (explaining that felony murder cannot be the murder required for conviction of a 
capital felony). 
 154. The three states are Arkansas, Colorado, and Oregon.  See supra note 143. 
 155. Tison, 481 U.S. at 153.  The majority mentioned that “at least” six states considered such 
mitigating circumstances, but only cited six. 
 156. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (2001); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(5) (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(j) (West 2006); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(4)(d)–(e) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h) (West 2001); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (LexisNexis 2004); KAN. 
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Three states actually have multiple mitigators that take culpability into 
account.157  Colorado and Arizona, the state in which the Tison case originated, 
now require consideration of whether the defendant’s conduct in the offense 
was relatively minor compared to the other actors’ conduct, and whether the 
defendant reasonably could have foreseen that his or her conduct during the 
felony would cause someone’s death.158  In addition to providing mitigation for 
a defendant’s minor participation, New Hampshire allows the jury to consider 
that equally culpable defendants did not receive the death penalty.159 
Instead of listing statutory mitigators, Ohio’s statute provides a list of 
considerations for the jury to weigh against the statutory aggravating 
circumstances.160  The state requires a jury to consider “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and [the] background of 
the offender . . . .”161  In addition, the jury must consider “the degree of the 
offender’s participation in the offense and the degree of the offender’s 
participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim.”162 
Texas does not provide a list of mitigating circumstances that the 
defendant can present to the jury.  However, the state’s sentencing statute 
requires the court to submit to the jury the issue of whether or not the 
defendant actually caused the death of the victim, or did not actually cause the 
death but did intend for the death to occur.163 
 
STAT. ANN. § 21-4637 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(h) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. §  99-19-
101(6) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (Supp. 
2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI) (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 15A-2000(f) 
(2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West Supp. 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
20(C)(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(j) (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070 
(West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(j) (2005). 
 157. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3)–(4) (Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-
1201(4)(d)–(e) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(c), (g) (1996). 
 158. See supra note 157 (providing Arizona’s and Colorado’s mitigation statutes). 
 159. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(g) (1996). 
 160. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1)–(7) (West Supp. 2006). 
 161. Id. § 2929.04(B). 
 162. Id. § 2929.04(B)(6). 
 163. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
918 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:895 
3. Additional Aggravating Circumstances 
Fourteen states currently require the state to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance (beyond commission or attempted 
commission of the underlying felony) before authorizing the death penalty in a 
felony murder case.164  When compared to the three states that the Tison 
majority cited as requiring additional aggravation, this figure represents an 
increase of almost 400%.165 
Of the fourteen states that require additional aggravation, three still do not 
authorize the death penalty in most cases for defendants who did not kill or 
intend to kill.  As previously discussed, the Colorado and Oregon statutes 
provide an affirmative defense for nontriggermen who did not intend to kill.166  
All of New Mexico’s aggravators require intent to kill, except when the victim 
is a law enforcement officer.167 
4. Felony Murder Simpliciter 
Imposition of the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter is obsolete.  
As mentioned above, only three state statutes have not been updated to prohibit 
a defendant’s execution solely for participation in an enumerated felony in 
which someone was killed.168  That figure represents half of the number of 
states that the Tison majority cited as allowing for capital punishment in cases 
of felony murder simpliciter.169 
 
 164. The fourteen states include the thirteen states listed supra note 133 and New Mexico.  
N.M. STAT. §§ 31-20A-3, 31-20A-5 (2005).  New Mexico was not included in the previously 
mentioned list because it is not among the twenty-two states that authorize the use of the death 
penalty on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill (unless the victim is a law enforcement 
officer).  Id. § 31-20A-5. 
 165. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 153 (1987). 
 166. See supra note 143. 
 167. N.M. STAT. § 31-20A-5 (2000). 
 168. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.  Enmund established that imposition of 
the death penalty for felony murder simpliciter is unconstitutional.  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 797 (1982).  Tison did not overrule this holding in that the Court still required a showing of a 
culpable mental state.  481 U.S. at 157–59.  Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina, therefore, may 
simply have neglected to revise their statutes to reflect these decisions, assuming that the Court 
automatically would apply the Enmund or Tison standard to each case.  See supra notes 139–40 
and accompanying text. 
 169. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 153.  The Court referred to “six states which Enmund classified 
along with Florida as permitting capital punishment for felony murder simpliciter.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  This statement implies that seven states actually authorized the punishment for 
felony murder simpliciter; however, the Court cited only six and included Florida in its list.  Id. at 
n.8. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA 919 
5. “New” Death Penalty States 
Since the Court decided Tison, Kansas and New York have reinstated the 
death penalty.170  Both of these states forbid the imposition of the death penalty 
on defendants who did not intend to kill.171  Also, New York does not even 
classify felony murder as first degree, but rather as second degree, indicating 
the legislature’s judgment that traditional felony murder does not involve the 
level of culpability required to justify punishment for first degree murder.172  
These two states represent legislatures that likely have considered the death 
penalty issue more closely and more thoroughly than other states since Tison, 
because these state legislatures had to formulate entire statutes before 
reinstating the death penalty.  After assuredly long debates and careful 
consideration, both legislatures found the death penalty to be disproportionate 
punishment for defendants who did not kill or intend to kill. 
D. Summary of Statutory Findings 
Twenty-eight states forbid imposing the death penalty on nontriggermen 
who did not intend to kill.173  Of the twenty-two states that allow the death 
penalty for nontriggermen under certain circumstances, nearly all have some 
kind of statutory safeguard to limit its use on such offenders.  Most of these 
states provide a statutory mitigator for minor participation in the felony,174 and 
some require proof of an additional aggravator, of a culpable mental state, or a 
combination of both.  Therefore, only one state’s legislature has failed to 
incorporate the Enmund and Tison decisions into its homicide and death 
penalty statutes.175 
In two of its most recent analyses regarding the death penalty, Atkins and 
Roper, the Court based its holdings largely on the “consistency of the direction 
of change” among state legislatures.176  The legislatures appear to be, on 
balance, moving toward prohibiting the death penalty’s use on nontriggermen 
 
 170. For reasons not relevant to this discussion, the highest courts in Kansas and New York 
declared the states’ death penalty statutes unconstitutional in 2004.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 580 app. A (2005). 
 171. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2004). 
 172. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 2004). 
 173. This figure represents the twelve states that have abolished the death penalty, plus the 
sixteen discussed supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 174. Supra note 156.  The Enmund Court said that the presence of these mitigators indicated 
that states wanted to reduce the chance of nontriggermen receiving the death penalty.  Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 793 (1982). 
 175. See supra note 140 (providing a possible explanation of why felony murder simpliciter 
statutes still exist).  Georgia is the only state whose statute does not appear to have incorporated 
Enmund and Tison.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 176. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 
(2002). 
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who did not intend to kill; however, the change has not been significant and 
does not appear to be happening very quickly. 
IV.  PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
If the Court reconsiders the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty 
on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill, its complete opinion must 
include a proportionality analysis.177  In fact, a strong proportionality argument 
may overcome weaker objective evidence, as it did in Atkins, according to 
Justice O’Connor.178  To overrule Tison, the Court would have to show that a 
defendant who does not kill or intend to kill does not deserve the same 
punishment as someone who intended for the murder to occur, or who actually 
committed the murder.  In making this showing, the Court would have to 
demonstrate that the penological goals of the death penalty—retribution and 
deterrence—would not be served by executing such defendants. 
A. Culpability and Retribution 
States began dividing murder into degrees to recognize that the “several 
forms of murder varied greatly in degree of atrociousness.”179  Differentiating 
murders then enabled the states to “match the penalty to the seriousness of the 
offense.”180  The death penalty is the most serious and severe punishment; 
therefore, it follows that it should be used only for the most serious crimes. 
1. Other Serious Crimes 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the death penalty 
should be reserved for the most serious crimes and has noted that only a 
narrow group of crimes falls into that category.181  Among the list of crimes 
that the Court has determined to be unquestionably severe but not worthy of 
the death penalty are 1) the rape of an adult woman,182 2) murder committed by 
 
 177. In his Tison dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the Constitution and Supreme Court 
precedent require that the Court include a proportionality analysis in Eighth Amendment cases 
involving the death penalty.  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 168 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 178. In her dissent in Roper, Justice O’Connor said that the objective evidence in Atkins was 
too weak to support the Court’s ruling, but that “the compelling proportionality argument against 
capital punishment of the mentally retarded played a decisive role in the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment ruling.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 606 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 179. See, e.g., Bruce v. State, 566 A.2d 103, 107 (Md. 1989). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).  States that continually expand 
lists of aggravating circumstances actually defy this notion.  For example, the Illinois death 
penalty statute included seven aggravating circumstances when it was passed in 1977; now, there 
are twenty-one different ways that a defendant can be eligible for the death penalty.  TUROW, 
supra note 6, at 67–68. 
 182. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)). 
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the mentally retarded,183 3) murder committed by a juvenile under the age of 
eighteen,184 and 4) felony murder in which the defendant did not kill or intend 
to kill.185  A reason for the Court’s hesitance in applying the death penalty in 
such cases is that the defendants lack the “extreme culpability [that] makes 
them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”186 
The Roper Court found that juveniles lack this culpability due to a variety 
of factors that essentially prevent the defendants from properly weighing the 
consequences of their actions and from independently forming the intent 
required to make them extremely culpable.187  If the Court has found that a 
seventeen-year-old who actually formed an intent to kill is not extremely 
culpable, in part because he was not capable of making an informed decision, 
then it defies logic to find that a defendant who never forms such an intent or 
makes such a decision does possess extreme culpability.188 
As the Enmund Court noted, robbery is a serious crime that deserves 
adequate punishment.189  However, it is not “so grievous an affront to 
humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”190  
Referring to the crime of robbery, the Court said, 
[I]t does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking 
of human life.  Although it may be accompanied by another crime, [robbery] 
by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another 
person.  The murderer kills; the [robber], if no more than that, does not.  Life is 
over for the victim of the murderer; for the [robbery] victim, life . . . is not over 
and normally is not beyond repair.191 
This same line of reasoning applies to any underlying felony that a 
defendant may be guilty of forming an intent to commit.  Arson, kidnapping, 
rape, robbery, and burglary all deserve serious punishment.  The mental state 
required to commit these crimes, however, is far from the mental state 
involved in intentionally taking a human life.  Defendants who do not kill or 
intend to kill lack the very thing that makes the crime of murder so 
reprehensible: the thought process in which they decide that it is acceptable to 
end a human life. 
 
 183. Id.  (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)). 
 186. See id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). 
 187. See supra note 16 (providing a list of factors that led to the Court’s determination that 
juveniles are not among the most culpable offenders). 
 188. In Roper, the defendant, seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons, killed a woman by 
throwing her off of a bridge.  543 U.S. at 556–57.  In planning the murder with his friends, 
Simmons assured them that they could “get away with it” because of their ages.  Id. at 556. 
 189. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798. 
 190. Id.  (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976)). 
 191. Id.  (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)). 
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2. Reckless Indifference 
Acting recklessly and without concern for human life certainly is morally 
reprehensible behavior that deserves severe punishment—especially when a 
life is, in fact, lost as a result.192  However, as Justice Brennan acknowledged 
in his Tison dissent, a reckless person’s culpability is necessarily less than that 
of a person who actually killed or intended to kill.193  The reckless actor is less 
culpable because he did not make a choice to kill another human being.194  The 
law traditionally punishes individuals based on the decisions they make.  A 
person who chooses to rob should be punished for making—and acting on—
that choice.  A person who chooses to rob and to kill someone in the process 
should be punished for making both of those choices and certainly should be 
punished on a different level than the person who chose only to rob. 
a. Model Penal Code 
Proponents of applying the death penalty to nontriggermen who did not 
intend to kill may point out that the Model Penal Code (MPC) includes in its 
definition of murder “[homicide] committed recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”195  Grouping this 
type of homicide into the same category as homicides committed purposely or 
knowingly, these proponents may argue, indicates that the drafters of the MPC 
equated reckless indifference with intent.  This reasoning may support the 
classification scheme, but it still does not support imposing the death penalty 
on defendants who merely exhibit extreme indifference rather than an actual 
intent to kill.  The Comments to MPC section 210.2, the section on murder, 
indicate that the drafters considered how states at the time classified murder 
and whether they included a form of reckless homicide.196  However, the 
drafters did not consider whether the states they referenced had a death penalty 
or whether the states that did have the death penalty allowed for it to be 
imposed in cases of reckless homicide.  Absent such consideration, it cannot be 
argued that the drafters of the MPC supported applying the death penalty to 
cases in which the defendant did not kill or intend to kill—they simply 
supported classifying extreme cases of reckless homicide as murder. 
 
 192. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 135, 170–71 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 171. 
 194. Id. at 170–71. 
 195. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
 196. Id. § 210.2 cmt. 4 at 26 (noting, among other statutory observations, that at least fifteen 
states recently revised their murder statutes, but maintained a form of reckless homicide). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] REVISITING TISON v. ARIZONA 923 
b. Common Law 
Common law, however, defined murder as killing with “malice 
aforethought.”197  At common law, malice consisted of killing “another human 
being without justification (e.g., self-defense), excuse (e.g., insanity), or 
mitigating circumstance (e.g., sudden heat of passion).”198  These types of 
homicides traditionally are included as first degree murder in states that grade 
offenses.199  On the other hand, manifesting extreme indifference to human life 
is considered implied malice, which most often is classified as second 
degree.200  Therefore, at common law, the death penalty would not apply to a 
homicide in which the defendant exhibited extreme indifference to human life, 
but did not kill or intend to kill. 
c. Rome Statute 
The international community does not consider recklessness to be as 
culpable of a mental state as intent.  Although the United States is not a party 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), its modern 
significance is arguably more noteworthy than that of the MPC.201  The 
drafting process of the Rome Statute resembles that of the MPC, only on an 
international level.  It was a collaboration of the ideas of numerous countries  
and was adopted only after several revisions and extensive negotiations, 
including comprehensive discussions regarding the crimes over which the ICC 
should have jurisdiction.202  Not only does it represent an international, rather 
than a national, consensus, but it was created several decades after the MPC 
was created.203 
 
 197. Id. § 210.2 cmt. 1 at 13 (citing Royal Comm’n on Capital Punishment, Report, CMD. 
No. 8932, at 26 (1953)). 
 198. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 506. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 512. 
 201. The International Criminal Court website provides a list of the one hundred current State 
Parties to the Rome Statute.  International Criminal Court: The States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).  One author predicts that 
the Rome Statute will have a far-reaching effect beyond its application on an international level: 
The influence of the Rome Statute will extend deep into domestic criminal law. . . .  
National courts have shown, in recent years, a growing enthusiasm for the use of 
international law materials in the application of their own laws.  The Statute itself, and 
eventually the case law of the International Criminal Court, will no doubt contribute in 
this area. 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 19 
(2001). 
 202. See generally SCHABAS, supra note 201, at 1–20 (discussing the creation of the ICC). 
 203. The Rome Statute originally was adopted by 120 international states on July 17, 1998.  
Id. at vii.  The MPC was adopted by the American Law Institute on May 24, 1962.  MODEL 
PENAL CODE (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
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The drafters of the Rome Statute debated about whether or not to lower the 
mens rea threshold in Article 30 to that of recklessness or gross negligence.  
They ultimately decided that the “most serious crimes” over which the ICC 
had jurisdiction necessarily required intent.204  By deleting a bracketed text on 
recklessness, the drafters, who represented a large part of the international 
community, asserted that recklessness and intent are not equally culpable 
mental states.205 
3. The Average Offender 
The Court has reiterated that the culpability of the average offender does 
not justify applying the death penalty.206  The Court has reasoned that if the 
average offender is not culpable enough to deserve the most severe punishment 
available, then juvenile and mentally retarded offenders definitely do not 
warrant this type of retribution.207  Defendants who do not kill or intend to kill 
similarly are not among the average offenders and certainly should not be held 
more accountable than the average murderer. 
4. Balancing the Wrong to the Victim and Expressing the Community’s 
Moral Outrage 
The Roper Court said that retribution can involve either balancing the 
wrong done to the victim208 or expressing the community’s “moral outrage” 
toward the offense.209  Neither of these purposes is properly served by 
imposing the death penalty on defendants who did not kill or intend to kill. 
This class of defendants does not actually take the victim’s life, so 
counteracting the victim’s death with such a defendant’s death does not 
establish balance.  Proponents of this principle of retribution may argue that an 
actual killer, or a defendant who intended for the victim to be killed, can be 
executed to “balance” the harm done.  However, they cannot in good 
conscience argue that executing a nontriggerman who did not intend to kill 
provides proper balance. 
There are several dangers inherent in allowing community sentiment to 
dictate punishment.  First of all, community sentiment can be fleeting, and we 
should be extremely hesitant to let such sentiment contribute to an irreversible, 
 
 204. SCHABAS, supra note 201, at 86; see also text accompanying infra notes 246–47. 
 205. See SCHABAS, supra note 201, at 86–87. 
 206. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 
(2002). 
 207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20. 
 208. This principle of retribution coincides with the “eye for an eye” theory of punishment.  
For a discussion of the defining characteristics of retributivist theory of punishment, see Michael 
S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, as reprinted in JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 39–40 (3d ed. 2003). 
 209. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
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permanent punishment.210  Also, we should not allow for a human life to be 
taken simply as a salve for a community’s anger.  Individuals should be 
punished based on the crimes they actually commit—not on the crimes as the 
public sees them or on the outrage that the public may justifiably express at the 
result of the crime.211 
Lay citizens most likely are not aware of the criminal elements necessary 
to prove that a crime has been committed—especially the concept of mens rea 
and its role in determining what crime has been committed.  Therefore, when 
such citizens who support the death penalty learn of a robbery in which 
someone was killed, the knee-jerk reaction may be to demand the death of 
anyone involved in the robbery because, in their minds, any killing is murder 
and any murder is death penalty-eligible.  This obviously is not how the legal 
system operates, and if it did, there would be no punishment left to distinguish 
the most abhorrent and most reprehensible crimes. 
Allowing community and victim judgments to dictate punishment also may 
contribute to the randomness associated with applying the death penalty.  
Some victims’ families and communities may oppose the death penalty or may 
be more willing to accept the quick finality of a defendant’s guilty plea.  Other 
families and communities, however, may insist that prosecutors go to trial and 
pursue the death penalty at all costs.  As a result, one defendant may receive 
life in prison while another is executed after committing a virtually identical 
crime.212 
 
 210. The American public’s moral outrage often wanes with time.  For example, when the 
public first learned of President Bill Clinton’s affair with his intern, there was a cry for 
impeachment and obvious public disgust for his conduct.  However, by the time Kenneth Starr’s 
investigation was completed, the public seemed to be directing its disgust toward Starr and his 
voracious attack on the President.  This example is not an attempt to compare President Clinton’s 
extramarital affair with the atrocity of murder, but rather to demonstrate how the public can insist 
on the worst punishment possible immediately after learning of an offender’s act, only to later 
realize that such punishment may need to be reserved for conduct that is even more egregious.  
“[T]he sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a 
seal is to hot wax.  It converts into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a 
transient sentiment.”  JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 80–82 (1883), as reprinted in DRESSLER, supra note 208, at 41. 
 211. Immanuel Kant advocated the principle that a human being should never be used to 
satisfy someone else’s purpose.  Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, as reprinted in 
DRESSLER, supra note 208, at 40.  “Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a 
means for promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil 
society . . . .”  Id. 
 212. According to an Associated Press study of the Ohio death penalty, 50% of the capital 
indictments filed between 1981 and 2002 resulted in plea bargains.  Death Penalty Information 
Center, Arbitrariness: Prevalence of Plea Bargains in Death Penalty Cases, http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2093 (scroll to article) (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).  Of the cases 
that ended in plea agreements, 131 of the defendants killed multiple victims; meanwhile, 196 of 
the 274 people sentenced to death during the same time period had killed a single victim.  Id. 
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B. Deterrence 
The deterrent value of the death penalty for any kind of murder is 
debatable, and most likely will continue to be debated as long as the death 
penalty is applied.213  However, the Tison Court did not provide a single 
deterrent argument for applying the death penalty in felony murder cases.214  
The death penalty cannot be an effective deterrent when the felony itself did 
not carry with it a substantial risk of death and when there was no intent for the 
murder to take place. 
1. Low Risk of Death Even in Inherently Dangerous Felonies 
Robbery, rape, and burglary are considered some of the most inherently 
dangerous felonies, as evidenced by the fact that they are among the 
enumerated felonies in virtually every felony murder statute.215  However, the 
Enmund Court noted that the risk of someone dying during the course of a 
robbery is not so substantial that someone who simply participates in the 
robbery should share in the blame when a victim is killed.216  In fact, crime 
statistics at the time showed that, in 1980, death occurred only in about 0.43% 
of robberies—supporting the majority’s argument that the death penalty cannot 
act as an effective deterrent in such cases.217  If this statistic was enough to 
support the Court’s finding in 1982, then the present statistics are even more 
convincing. 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reports, only 0.25% of robberies in 2004 resulted in murder.218  The 
percentage of robberies that result in murder has dropped to nearly half of the 
percentage that the Enmund Court found to be an insignificant amount.  As for 
 
 213. A survey of leaders among the top criminological societies in the country revealed that 
84% of those experts said that the death penalty is not a deterrent to murder.  Facts About the 
Death Penalty (Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C.), at 3, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).  Also, the South has 
the highest murder rate among all of the regions in the United States, but also accounts for 56% 
of the executions nationwide.  Id.  Meanwhile, the Northeast has the lowest murder rate and 
accounts for less than 1% of executions.  Id.  Another study shows that death penalty states 
usually have higher murder rates than neighboring non-death penalty states.  Death Penalty 
Information Center: Deterrence, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (follow “Issues” hyperlink; 
then follow “Deterrence” hyperlink; then follow “Studies Comparing States with and without the 
Death Penalty” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 214. See supra Part II.B.2.D. 
 215. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(a)(3) (West 
2005). 
 216. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 781, 799 (1982). 
 217. Id. at 800 n.24. 
 218. There were 401,326 reported robberies in 2004 and 988 murders that occurred during the 
course of a robbery.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 
2004—UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 23, 31 (2004). 
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rape, 0.038% of the 94,635 rapes reported in 2004 resulted in murder.219  Of 
the 2,143,456 burglaries reported in 2004, only 77 resulted in murder.220  That 
means that burglary, considered by state legislatures to be among the most 
inherently dangerous felonies, carries with it only a 0.0036% chance of 
someone being killed. 
When someone actually is killed during one of these felonies, if the death 
penalty is not frequently imposed on such defendants, its deterrent value is 
reduced even further.  Although recent numbers are not available, one of the 
drafts of the MPC noted that the “odds against a robbery ending with a death 
sentence . . . were . . . 1,286 to 1,” and the odds were 1,133 to 1 that a rapist 
would be sentenced to death.221  These numbers imply two things.  First, juries 
do not often sentence felony murder defendants to death when they did not kill 
or intend to kill.  This jury hesitance itself is a consideration in determining 
whether the death penalty is constitutional in certain circumstances.  Second, 
the death penalty is applied so infrequently in these situations that the 
punishment is not likely to deter either the commission of the underlying 
felony or any killing that occurs during the course of the felony. 
This argument is not an attempt to minimize the value of the lives actually 
lost during these felonies, but rather is meant to demonstrate that there is no 
deterrent value in executing defendants who did not kill or intend to kill while 
participating in these felonies.  The numbers represent the fact that an 
overwhelming majority of defendants who participate in these felonies do not 
kill, so the threat of the death penalty would not have any effect in keeping 
them from killing.  As for deterring them from participating in the underlying 
felonies, the death penalty is an improper deterrent.  First, threatening death for 
participating in a felony in which killing is not an essential element is 
inherently unbalanced and certainly excessive.  Also, the chance of a murder 
occurring during the course of such a felony is so minute that an offender most 
likely would not consider the possibility of the death penalty when deciding 
whether or not to commit a robbery, for example. 
2. Deterring Recklessness 
A penological goal of any punishment is to deter commission of the crime 
associated with the punishment.  The courts in People v. Gentry222 and Bruce 
 
 219. There were 36 murders reportedly committed in conjunction with a rape in 2004.  Id. at 
23, 27. 
 220. Id. at 23, 45. 
 221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 cmt. 4(C) n.10 (Tentative Draft No. 9 1959). 
 222. People v. Gentry, 510 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
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v. State223 took notice that there would be no deterrent value in punishing 
defendants for crimes that they had no intention of committing.224 
In Gentry, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that to be guilty of 
attempted murder, a defendant must have had an intent to kill.225  The court 
said that “intent to do bodily harm, or knowledge that the consequences of 
defendant’s act may result in death or great bodily harm, is not enough.”226  
Using similar reasoning in Bruce, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
there is no such crime as attempted felony murder.227  Because the only intent 
required to prove felony murder is the intent to commit the underlying felony, 
and because criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, one cannot attempt to 
commit felony murder.228 
In Gentry, the defendant acted recklessly and put the victim’s life in 
danger;229 however, because he did not specifically intend to kill her, punishing 
him for trying to kill her would have had no effect in keeping him (or others) 
from attempting murder in the future. 
The Bruce court noted, “There is no such criminal offense as an attempt to 
achieve an unintended result.”230  In so finding, the court recognized that there 
would be no deterrent value in punishing someone for a crime he or she did not 
intend to commit.  If results are unintended, as they necessarily are in the cases 
of nontriggermen who did not intend to kill, then there can be no deterrent 
value in executing such defendants.  Executing these defendants will not keep 
others like them from deciding to take a life, because they never made that 
decision. 
 
 223. Bruce, 566 A.2d at 106. 
 224. One scholar suggests that the only types of conduct that criminal law can affect are 
intentional action and forbearance.  Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal 
Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 363 (2004).  Because the goal of criminal law is to 
guide behavior, Professor Morse argues that “a rational system of criminal law should focus 
solely on actions and should not impose punishment based on results.”  Id.  The drafters of the 
MPC similarly argued, “[M]urders are, upon the whole, either crimes of passion, in which a 
calculus of consequences has small psychological reality, or crimes of such depravity that the 
actor reveals himself as doubtfully within the reach of influences that might be especially 
inhibitory in the case of the ordinary man.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft 
No. 9 1959). 
 225. Gentry, 510 N.E.2d at 966. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Bruce, 566 A.2d at 106 
 228. Id. at 105. 
 229. See Gentry, 510 N.E.2d at 964. 
 230. Bruce, 566 A.2d at 105. 
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V.  INTERNATIONAL OPINION231 
Whereas the Roper Court was able to point to specific international laws 
prohibiting the execution of juveniles, international guidance on executing 
nontriggermen who did not intend to kill is less specific.232  A common theme 
in the international community is that countries that still use the death penalty 
should impose it only for the most serious of crimes.  Treaties and other 
international documents indicate that the international community defines the 
most serious crimes as including an intent to kill. 
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Along with other members of the United Nations, the United States ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)233 in an effort 
“to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms.”234  Article 6(2) of the treaty states: “In countries which have not 
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the 
most serious crimes . . . .”235  While the Court claims to follow the ideal of 
imposing the death penalty only for the most serious crimes, it is doubtful that 
the Court’s definition of what constitutes the “most serious crimes” coincides 
with the meaning that the ICCPR intended for that category of crimes. 
B. American Declaration 
The United States is a member of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), which has adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
 
 231. This Comment will not discuss the general role of international law in interpreting death 
penalty jurisprudence.  For a discussion of this topic, see Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty 
in the United States: An International Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115 
(2002); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004). 
 232. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 233. The ICCPR is a binding treaty that provides restrictions on how countries use the death 
penalty.  Bishop, supra note 231, at 1131.  In 1998, President Clinton stated: “It shall be the 
policy and practice of the Government of the United States, being committed to the protection 
and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, fully to respect and implement its 
obligations under the international human rights treaties to which it is a party.”  Id. at 1117 
(quoting Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998)). 
 234. International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  The United States ratified the ICCPR with a restriction 
stating that “[t]he United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to 
impose capital punishment on any person (other than pregnant women) duly convicted under 
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such 
punishment . . . .”  Bishop, supra note 231, at 1133–34 (emphasis added). 
 235. ICCPR, supra note 234, at art. 6, § 2. 
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of Man.236  The OAS then adopted the American Convention on Human 
Rights,237 which states that the death penalty only can be imposed for the most 
serious crimes.238  The United States has not yet ratified this Convention.239 
C. Interpreting “Most Serious Crimes” 
1. United Nations 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly 
emphasized that the “most serious crimes” include only intentional crimes.  
Beginning in 1999, the Commission has annually adopted a resolution that 
states that “the notion of ‘most serious crimes’ does not go beyond intentional 
crimes with lethal or extremely grave consequences.”240  Each year, the 
resolution “[u]rges all States that still maintain the death penalty . . . to comply 
fully with their obligations under the [ICCPR] . . . , notably not to impose the 
death penalty for any but the most serious crimes . . . .”241 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted these standards 
in its death penalty safeguards.  The first safeguard states that “capital 
punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes, it being 
 
 236. Bishop, supra note 231, at 1142.  The American Declaration became legally binding in 
1967.  Id. at 1142–43.  The OAS created it under the ideal that “[e]very human being has the right 
to life, liberty and the security of his person.”  Id. at 1142. 
 237. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673. 
 238.  Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Información–historia, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); see Bishop, supra note 231, at 
1143. 
 239. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Información–historia, supra note 238.  The 
Convention created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights to promote and protect the principles of the Convention.  Id.  Because the 
United States has not adopted the American Convention on Human Rights, it is questionable 
whether the country is bound by the advisory opinions and court decisions rendered by these two 
bodies.  However, it is included in this discussion for purposes of explaining international 
standards as they apply to the death penalty in cases of unintentional crimes. 
 240. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2005/59 ¶ 7(f), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/59 (Apr. 20, 
2005); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2004/67 ¶ 4(f), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/67 (Apr. 21, 
2004); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/67 ¶ 4(d), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67 (Apr. 24, 
2003); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2002/77 ¶ 4(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77 (Apr. 25, 
2002); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2001/68 ¶ 4(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (Apr. 25, 
2001); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2000/65 ¶ 3(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (Apr. 26, 
2000); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1999/61 ¶ 3(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (Apr. 28, 
1999). 
 241. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2002/77 ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/77 (Apr. 25, 
2002); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2001/68 ¶ 4(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/68 (Apr. 25, 
2001); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2000/65 ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 (Apr. 26, 
2000); Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1999/61 ¶ 3(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (Apr. 28, 
1999). 
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understood that their scope should not go beyond intentional crimes with lethal 
or other extremely grave consequences.”242 
2. Rome Statute 
The preamble to the Rome Statute of the ICC states that “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished . . . .”243  This language establishes that the scope of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is limited to only the most serious crimes.  Article 30 of the statute 
states that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.”244  Article 30, taken together with the 
Preamble, indicates that the drafters of the Rome Statute considered intent a 
necessary element of crimes in the “most serious” category. 
3. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has held that the death 
penalty must not be imposed for crimes that are not of “exceptional gravity.”245  
The Commission noted that the varying degrees of gravity and individual 
culpability must be considered before imposing the death penalty.246  The 
Commission also has recognized that a botched robbery attempt in which the 
 
 242. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those 
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1984/50 (May 25, 1984). 
 243. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]. 
 244. Id. at art. 30.  Article 30 goes on to define “intent,” explaining, 
For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
Id. at art. 30(2).  The statute defines “knowledge” as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.” Id. at art. 30(3). 
 245. See, e.g., Garza v. United States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/01, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 29 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/ 
2000eng/chapteriii/merits/USA12.243.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
 246. See Edwards v. Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/01, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 65 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/ 
2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Bahamas12.067.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007); Hall v. Bahamas, 
Case 12.068, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 65 (2001), 
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Bahamas12.067.htm (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2007); Schroeter & Bowleg v. Bahamas, Case 12.086, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 65 (2001), available at http://www.cidh.org/ 
annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Merits/Bahamas12.067.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2007). 
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defendant did not kill or intend to kill the victims was not a crime of 
exceptional gravity and did not warrant the death penalty.247 
D. International Law and the Tison Crime 
The Tison decision and the standard it set forth violate these international 
standards because the Tison brothers did not intend for the murders to take 
place; therefore, they were sentenced to death for a crime that does not meet 
the “most serious” criteria.  The intentional crimes referred to in the safeguards 
cannot be the underlying felony in a felony murder case, because even the 
Court has conceded that crimes outside of murder are not serious enough to 
qualify for the death penalty.248 
CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court revisits the issue of whether it is constitutional to 
execute an offender who did not kill or intend to kill, it should consider, as it 
has in the past, legislative judgments, proportionality, retribution, and 
deterrence rationales, and international law and opinion.  A thorough review of 
current legislation reveals that a majority of states do not provide further 
restrictions than those imposed by Enmund and Tison.  However, most of the 
states that do not prohibit punishment for defendants who did not kill or intend 
to kill have statutory safeguards in place so that less culpable offenders have 
less of a chance of being executed. 
The two justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—
do not apply to felony murder cases in which the defendant did not kill or 
intend to kill.  If the Court considers international law and the United States’ 
treaty obligations, it will find that an honest definition of the “most serious 
crimes” cannot include those in which a defendant did not kill or intend to kill. 
Although, based on a thorough proportionality analysis, the Court should 
hold that it is unconstitutional to execute a defendant who did not kill or intend 
to kill, it is not likely to do so if it revisits the issue in the near future.  For the 
Court to overrule Tison, either more state legislatures will need to revise their 
statutes so that nontriggermen who did not intend to kill are not eligible for the 
death penalty, or international law will have to take a more definite stance on 
the issue.  With a compelling proportionality argument, evidence of changing 
 
 247. Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 57/96, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 177 (1996).  In the Andrews case, the defendant and an 
accomplice, Pierre Selby, went to rob a radio store, where people still happened to be present.  Id. 
at ¶ 39.  Andrews and Selby restrained the victims in the basement of the store, and Selby made 
them drink drain cleaner.  Id.  After stating that he could not make the victims drink the poison, 
Andrews left the store.  Unbeknownst to Andrews, Selby then shot the victims.  Id. at ¶ 39–40.  
One survivor verified Andrews’s version of the events.  Id. 
 248. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
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legislative judgment or well-defined international law could influence the 
Court.249  However, a proportionality argument alone is not likely to convince 
a majority of the Justices of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty in these 
cases. 
The effects of a murder are equal, no matter who kills or is killed: a victim 
loses a life, a survivor loses a loved one, and society as a whole loses some of 
its dignity.  Although the effects are equal, however, the crimes and the 
culpability of those involved are not.  Our criminal justice system is based on 
this “inequality” of crimes, and our punishments must reflect it.  The most 
critical choice a criminal can make is whether to take a human life.  One of the 
most critical choices our criminal justice system can make is whether to 
recognize the criminal’s choice. 
MELANIE A. RENKEN* 
 
 249. Research of jury activity in death penalty cases involving nontriggermen would shed 
additional light on the constitutionality of applying the death penalty in such cases.  The Court 
should consider how often juries impose the death penalty in these cases.  If juries rarely impose 
the punishment, then this would weigh heavily in favor of finding it unconstitutional. 
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